Software Circle plc (SFT) — Research Note
Executive summary
Software Circle is an AIM-listed serial acquirer of UK/Ireland vertical market software (VMS) businesses, now operating 11 decentralised units across Graphics/Ecommerce, Professional & Financial Services, Health & Social Care, Property and Education. Over the three years to FY26, revenue has compounded 24% CAGR to £22.3m, recurring revenue has gone from 35% to 76% of mix, and Adjusted EBITDA margin has risen from 3% to 26% — the model is clearly working. The key question for valuation today is whether the compounder deserves a 13–15x run-rate aEBITDA multiple given 2.0x net leverage, c.10% organic oEBITDA growth and continued balance-sheet-funded M&A.
Fair value estimate
- Fair value range: 18p – 25p per share, implying a market cap of £70m – £98m. Midpoint 21.5p / ~£84m.
- Methodology: multiple of run-rate Adjusted EBITDA for VMS compounders (Constellation/Judges comparable framework), cross-checked against EV/sales.
- Run-rate aEBITDA at year-end FY26 ≈ £6.8m (per CFO's report in 2026-07 final results).
- Applied multiple range of 12–16x run-rate aEBITDA → EV range £82m – £109m.
- Deduct net debt £11.4m → equity £70m – £97m → 18p – 25p.
- EV/sales cross-check: 3.0–4.0x £25m run-rate = EV £75–100m, broadly consistent.
- Compared to current market cap of £70.2m (19p), the stock sits at the bottom of my fair-value range: ~13% upside to the midpoint, downside to ~18p.
- Note: statutory EPS remains negative (-0.21p FY26) because of £4.8m of non-cash amortisation on acquired intangibles; so multiple-based valuation on cash-generative aEBITDA is the right lens rather than P/E.
Sector context
- Sector: Technology / Software – vertical market software compounder (B2B SaaS roll-up).
- Quality/growth/leverage vs peers: growth (revenue +22%, aEBITDA +83%) and margin trajectory (26% aEBITDA, OCFPS +120%) are above typical UK listed software peers of similar size; leverage (2.0x) is in line with scaled serial acquirers but higher than most pure-software peers; organic growth of 7% in the acquired portfolio is average for VMS; scale is sub-scale vs listed peers.
- Listed peers: Judges Scientific (JDG) — closest serial acquirer analogue, scientific instruments rather than software; Diploma (DPLM) — distribution roll-up; direct VMS: Constellation Software/Topicus (TSX, bigger), SDI Group (SDI), Idox (IDOX), Dotdigital. Judges Scientific and Constellation are the clearest spiritual templates the Board explicitly cites.
Investment thesis (3 bullets)
- Proven VMS flywheel executing to plan. FY26 added 7% organic revenue growth and 23% organic oEBITDA growth in the acquired portfolio, with aEBITDA margin stepping from 17% to 26% and OCFPS doubling to 1.1p. Gate 4 (£5m run-rate aEBITDA) hit a year early; Gate 5 (£15m) is 3-4 years away on current trajectory. The decentralised Constellation-style playbook is being implemented by a board that explicitly includes alumni of Constellation (Maurer) and Judges Scientific (Ormsby) 2024-09 board changes; 2026-07 final results.
- High-quality recurring revenue, cash-converting. Recurring revenue is 76% of mix (vs 35% three years ago), the acquired portfolio generates oEBITDA margins of 43% ("Rule of 50" quality score), cash from operations was £5.9m on £22.3m revenue, and Operating Return On Capital Deployed is 25%. 2026-07 final results, CFO report.
- New £25m Santander RCF unlocks the next phase cheaply. The May 2026 refinancing replaces the Shawbrook facility, prices at SONIA + 2.00–3.00% (vs higher Shawbrook terms), extends to 2030, lifts the gross-leverage covenant to 4.0x, and brings £14m of undrawn committed firepower. The business is "approaching the self-funded flywheel" where internally generated cash can fund acquisitions without equity dilution 2026-05 trading update; 2026-07 final results.
Key risks (3 bullets)
- Leverage trajectory and refinancing dependency. Net debt rose from £2.2m to £11.4m in FY26 (0.7x → 2.0x). Including a further £3.9m of contingent consideration at current performance, effective leverage is higher. The whole model assumes continued successful deployment at disciplined multiples; a cycle of weaker acquisitions or missed earn-out hurdles would quickly stretch 4.0x covenants 2026-07 final results, CFO report.
- AI thesis is defensive, not offensive. Management's AI narrative is thoughtful but the honest reading is: AI is a risk to VMS which they are managing through workflow embed, proprietary data and regulatory moats. There is no AI-driven revenue line disclosed, no quantified ARPU uplift, no AI-SKU sold today — "systems of action" and "owning the agent" remain forward commentary 2026-07 final results, CEO statement.
- Nettl legacy drag and organic growth concentration. Group organic revenue declined 1% in FY26 because Nettl Systems (Graphics & Ecommerce, 34% of revenue, originally the whole company) continues to shrink; strip Nettl and acquired portfolio grew 7%, which is decent but not exceptional. If the Group ever stops acquiring, organic growth is in the low single digits 2026-07 final results; 2025-11 interim results.
Operating leverage
Group-level operating leverage is moderate-to-high. The acquired portfolio runs on classic VMS economics — 90%+ recurring revenue in several units, gross margins over 70%, operating EBITDA margins of 43% at a Group level 2026-07 final results, CEO statement and recurring revenue per head run-rating at over £100k (up from £45k three years ago). Central costs of £1.8m (24% of oEBITDA) scale sub-linearly: FY25 central costs rose 20%, operating EBITDA 61%. A 10–20% group revenue beat flowing primarily through the acquired portfolio would plausibly add 25–50% to Adjusted EBITDA, as the £17m of acquired VMS revenue drops to the bottom line at near-70% incremental contribution margin (acquired portfolio incremental: organic revenue up £0.9m, organic oEBITDA up £1.06m in FY26, i.e. >100% incremental margin on the growth cohort 2026-07 final results). The constraint on multiples-of-profit upside is central costs and the drag from Nettl, not platform operating leverage.
Value-trap signals
- Nettl Systems in secular decline (-11.5% revenue FY26); so far managed through margin discipline, but there's no clear turnaround.
- Reported EPS remains negative four years into the strategy; the "transition to sustained net profitability" is management's forward view and depends on acquisition cadence slowing or scaling into fixed amortisation.
- Share price has derated from 25.8p to 19.0p over the past 12 months (−22%) despite record FY26 numbers — suggesting market has concerns I can't fully reconcile (perhaps leverage, small-cap sell-off, or scepticism on run-rate conversion).
- Otherwise none of the classic value-trap signatures (customer concentration, aggressive accounting, dividend cuts, regulatory threat) are present.
Earnings vs expectations
Management uses "Gate" milestones rather than quarterly guidance. FY25 (May 2025 trading update): guided aEBITDA margin to exceed 15%; delivered 17.3% — modest beat. FY26 (May 2026 pre-close): guided revenue £22.3m, aEBITDA £5.8m, 26% margin against previously communicated "25% target" — in line to modest beat. Gate 4 (£5m run-rate aEBITDA) hit ahead of plan. The acquired portfolio has consistently traded "ahead of valuation expectations" per management, with 20% EBITDA uplift versus underwriting cases 2024-07 final results, CEO statement. Pattern: consistent in-line to modest beats; no profit warnings; no material downgrades.
Conviction
Conviction: 3 — moderate. Anchors: (i) clean disclosure of run-rate aEBITDA, cash conversion and segmental organic growth — the key valuation inputs are well-disclosed; (ii) acquired portfolio metrics (43% oEBITDA margin, 25% oROCD, 7% organic growth) are repeatable benchmarks; (iii) new Santander facility and leverage ceiling make the balance-sheet trajectory legible. Caveats: (i) fair value swings materially with multiple assumption — 12x vs 16x on run-rate aEBITDA is the difference between 18p and 25p, and there is no clean public peer to anchor the right multiple; (ii) the valuation implicitly assumes continued M&A at disciplined multiples — if the pipeline deteriorates, both the run-rate and the deserved multiple compress together.