Old Mutual Limited (OMU) — Research Note
Executive summary
Old Mutual is a 180-year-old African financial services group (life & savings, asset management, P&C insurance, and a newly-launched retail bank) headquartered in South Africa, reporting in ZAR but listed on the LSE in pence. Over the period 2021–H1 2025 the group has worked through Covid mortality, the Nedbank unbundling, IFRS 17 adoption, the Zimbabwe currency reset, and exits from Nigeria/Tanzania; adjusted headline earnings (AHE) recovered strongly (FY22 R6.4bn → FY24 R6.7bn → H1 25 R4.2bn, +29% YoY), but value-of-new-business and group equity value softened sharply in H1 2025 2025-09 interim. The single most important valuation point today: the shares (58p) trade at roughly 0.75× group equity value (R18.40/share ≈ ~77p at ~ZAR23–24/GBP), so the question is whether the GEV figure is robust given the H1 2025 methodology resets and VNB margin compression from 2.5% to 1.3%.
Fair value estimate
Methodology: Group Equity Value (the group's own embedded-value-based intrinsic measure), cross-checked with a P/E multiple on adjusted headline earnings.
- GEV per share H1 2025: R18.40; FY 2024 R19.51 2025-09 interim. At a midpoint ZAR/GBP of ~23.5, GEV ≈ 78p/share.
- AHEPS FY 2024: 150.6c (ZAR); annualised H1 2025: ~193c. At ZAR23.5/GBP, that's 6.4–8.2p. A 9–11× multiple (in line with SA financial peers) implies 60–90p.
- Both approaches converge in the 70–85p range.
Fair value range: 70p – 85p per share → implied market cap £2,807m – £3,408m. Midpoint mcap ~£3,100m vs current £2,327.5m → ~33% upside to mid. At the low end (70p) the upside is ~21%; at the high end (85p) ~47%.
View: undervalued on intrinsic-value grounds, but the discount partially reflects justified concerns (SA macro, ZAR risk, recent VNB deterioration, GEV trending down).
Sector context
Sector classification (Insurance/Financials) confirmed. Old Mutual is a multi-line African composite — Life & Savings, Asset Management, P&C (Old Mutual Insure), Banking (OM Bank, launched 2025) and Property/Casualty in 12 countries. Quality is in line with EM insurance peers, growth is below (mid-single-digit AHE growth, weak top-line), balance sheet is above (Group solvency 172%, well within range). Listed peers: Sanlam (SLM SJ), Discovery (DSY SJ), Liberty Holdings/Standard Bank Group (also SA financials), and on UK-listed proxies, Prudential plc (Asia/Africa life) and Ninety One.
Investment thesis (3 bullets)
- Trading at ~75% of group equity value with a 6%+ dividend yield, while the underlying business continues to generate strong cash (R10.5bn remitted from subs in FY24, 158% of AHE) and announced a R3bn buyback in H1 2025 2025-09 interim; 2025-03 FY24 results.
- Operational recovery is genuine: AHE +29% in H1 2025, RoNAV at 15.5% (within target), Old Mutual Insure delivering 7.1% net underwriting margin vs 0.1% in FY23; the FY24 catalyst (OM Bank launch) is now live with a defined path to breakeven by 2028 2025-09 interim; 2025-03 FY24.
- Strategic clarity sharpened in late 2025: management has pivoted to four priorities, return-on-group-equity-value as primary KPI, exited unprofitable Nigeria/Tanzania, and outlined cost-out via operating-model redesign — providing an internal lever to restore the 2–3% VNB margin band 2025-10 CMD; 2025-09 interim.
Key risks (3 bullets)
- GEV is declining and assumption-sensitive: Group equity value fell 6% in H1 2025, value of new business halved (-50%) and VNB margin collapsed from 2.4% to 1.3% largely on persistency-assumption strengthening and non-hedgeable risk capital changes 2025-09 interim. If further assumption changes are needed, the intrinsic floor weakens.
- South Africa / ZAR concentration: The vast majority of earnings come from SA and ZAR-denominated African markets; SA growth ~1.7% with high household debt-to-income and high rates squeeze the Retail Mass customer; Zimbabwe currency reset already dragged IFRS earnings by ~R2.2bn 2025-08 trading; 2025-03 FY24.
- OM Bank execution + China impairment overhang: OM Bank carries a guided R1.1–1.3bn annual loss run-rate to 2028 (cumulative R2.8bn spent already), and the China JV was impaired in FY24 on lower-rate cash-flow assumptions 2025-03 FY24. Capital allocation outside the core could continue to underwhelm.
Operating leverage
Insurance is structurally a moderate-leverage business: a substantial share of costs (claims, commissions, distribution) scales with revenue, with fixed corporate centre, IT and regulatory costs as the leveraged component. Old Mutual's H1 2025 commentary highlighted "higher central costs, which includes a once-off restructuring provision incurred to reduce future expenditure" — i.e. the company is actively trying to create operating leverage by stripping out fixed overheads (operating model redesign, decommissioned 21 legacy systems, leaner corporate centre) 2025-09 interim; 2025-03 FY24. The asset management arm (R1.5tn FuM) is where real operating leverage exists — incremental flows drop at very high margins — but FuM growth is muted. A 10–20% upside revenue surprise across the group would likely lift operating profit by 25–40%, not multiples of profit. This is not the kind of high-fixed-cost, high-contribution-margin business the investor profile prizes.
Value-trap signals
- GEV per share is on a downward trajectory (R19.51 FY24 → R18.40 H1 25), partly driven by capital returns but also by negative methodology adjustments.
- VNB margin compression from 2.5% to 1.3% in a single half — the very metric management pivoted toward — is a material disappointment.
- Net client cash flow has been negative in 5 of the last 6 reporting periods, with R10.1bn outflow in H1 2025 alone.
- Repeated assumption strengthening (persistency in Mass & Foundation; non-hedgeable risk capital) suggests reported earnings have been flattered historically.
- Emerging-market currency and macro exposure is a structural valuation cap.
Earnings vs. expectations
Looking across trading statements vs delivered results (2021–2025): Old Mutual has consistently come in within or near the upper end of its pre-announced TS ranges. FY24 trading statement guided RFO -6% to +14% / AHE +4% to +24%; delivered RFO +4%, AHE +14% (mid-of-range). H1 2025 TS guided RFO +6%–26% / AHE +19%–39%; delivered RFO +16%, AHE +29% (mid-of-range). FY22 was a clear upside surprise (AHE > 100% growth as Covid provisions reversed). Pattern: mostly meets, occasional beats, no profit warnings in the period — but trading statements set wide ranges that are easy to hit.
Conviction
Conviction: 3 (moderate).
Anchors: (i) Group Equity Value disclosure provides a tangible intrinsic anchor; (ii) two independent methods (GEV and AHE P/E) converge on the same fair-value range; (iii) the consistent dividend, robust solvency, and cash remittance from subsidiaries support the floor.
Caveats: (i) GEV is sensitive to assumption changes that have already moved adversely in H1 2025 — the "anchor" is itself drifting; (ii) ZAR/GBP translation introduces meaningful uncertainty in the pence-denominated fair value; (iii) the OM Bank loss run-rate and growth-market pivots create medium-term earnings noise.