MHA PLC (AIM: MHA) — Research Note
Executive summary
MHA is a UK-headquartered mid-market professional services firm (audit, tax, accountancy and advisory), representing the Baker Tilly International network in the UK, Ireland and South-East Europe, with c.2,300 staff across 32 offices; it IPO'd on AIM in April 2025 raising £97.8m gross 2025-08-14 FY25. Trajectory has been strong and unbroken: revenue £154m → £224m → £251m (FY24→FY25→FY26), adjusted EBITDA c.£31m → £41m → £46m, with 87% recurring revenue and c.9% organic growth on top of a steady bolt-on M&A programme 2026-05-07 trading update; 2025-11-20 H1 26. The single most important point for valuation is that MHA is a high-quality, cash-generative professional-services compounder trading on ~8x EV/adj-EBITDA — attractive if you own it for the M&A roll-up story, but it is fundamentally a user of AI, not a beneficiary, so it does not fit the AI-receiver strategy.
Fair value estimate
- Fair value range: 140p – 170p per share (implied market cap £402m – £488m).
- Methodology: primary — EV/adjusted-EBITDA multiple applied to FY26 delivered adjusted EBITDA of £46m; secondary — P/E cross-check on adjusted earnings.
- EV/EBITDA: 8.5–10.0x on £46m = EV £391–460m; add net cash £24m → mcap £415–484m → 146–169p on 286.9m shares.
- P/E: H1 26 adjusted PBT £18.5m, H2 seasonally stronger → estimate FY26 adj PBT c.£38–40m; after 25% tax ≈ £29m PAT → adj EPS c.10p. At 14–16x → 140–162p.
- Consistent with UK challenger-professional-services multiples (Gateley, Begbies Traynor, K3 Capital take-outs) allowing for MHA's better growth but early listed track record.
- Mid fair value: ~155p per share / £445m market cap.
- Vs current £407.6m mcap (143.5p): upside c.+8% — the stock is fair to modestly undervalued.
Sector context
- Sector classification confirmed: Industrials / Industrial Goods & Services (business services).
- Quality/growth/leverage profile is above the typical AIM-listed professional-services peer: 87% recurring revenue (unusually high), 18% adjusted EBITDA margins, net cash £24m and 91% cash conversion 2025-08-14 FY25.
- Listed peers: Gateley plc (legal + advisory), Knights Group Holdings (legal), Begbies Traynor (restructuring/tax/advisory), FRP Advisory (restructuring/corp finance). MHA is closest to Gateley/Begbies as an audit-and-advisory challenger to the Big Four.
Investment thesis
- Structural tailwind + Big-Four displacement. UK audit/accounting market is £8.8bn growing 5% CAGR; regulatory complexity and audit-market reform are pushing mid-market work away from the Big Four toward scaled challengers with sector depth — MHA's H1 26 double-digit growth in FS, manufacturing and professional-services fees demonstrates this in action 2025-11-20 H1 26.
- Proven M&A compounding on a listed platform. MHA has integrated Moore & Smalley (2024), Baker Tilly Ireland (2024), BTSEE (Aug-25, Cyprus/Greece/SEE) and MS UAE (Apr-26) — three of these were bargain-purchase deals. The £98m IPO warchest and lockstep-vendor-equity model give a credible path to the stated £500m revenue medium-term ambition 2026-04-07 MS UAE completion; 2025-08-14 FY25.
- Fortress balance sheet at a reasonable multiple. Net cash £24m, 87% recurring fees, 91% cash conversion, no customer >10% — trading at c.8x EV/adj-EBITDA with FY26 delivered ahead of expectations (£46m vs £44m consensus) 2026-05-07 trading update. Downside protection is real; this is not a fragile balance sheet.
Key risks
- AI-driven substitution risk in audit and tax. Automation of standardised audit, tax-return prep and personal-tax compliance is precisely where mid-tier firms earn their recurring fees; management is investing in Co-Pilot/ChatGPT Enterprise to defend margin, but the medium-term direction of pricing on commodity compliance work is negative 2025-11-20 H1 26 — inferred from disclosure.
- Integration and partner-lockup risk in an acquisition roll-up. The BTSEE deal generated a £5.5m bargain-purchase gain because €21m of vendor equity was reclassified as deemed remuneration subject to lockup — MHA's growth model depends on retaining partners after multi-year clawback periods; departures would meaningfully impair goodwill and morale 2025-11-20 H1 26 note 8.
- Newly listed with limited public track record and reported-vs-adjusted noise. FY26 is MHA's first statutory reporting period; reported EBITDA is inflated by bargain-purchase credits, IPO costs, and deemed remuneration amortisation, so the "adjusted" number is doing significant work — margin of error on quality of earnings is wider than for a seasoned issuer 2025-11-20 H1 26 note 5.
Operating leverage
MHA is a people-heavy professional-services firm — this constrains operating leverage. In FY25, employee benefit expense was £89.9m on £224m revenue (40%), with a further large layer of partner remuneration (147 partners averaging £565k profit share) which is now expensed under the plc model. Cost base is therefore majority-variable to headcount, not truly fixed. EBITDA margin was 18.3% in FY25, 18% in H1 26 and 18.3% again on the FY26 outturn — remarkably flat and consistent with a labour-intensive services model where salary inflation eats scale benefits 2025-08-14 FY25; 2025-11-20 H1 26; 2026-05-07 trading update. There is some leverage on the c.£20m of central and property costs (32 offices, tech platform, listed-company overhead), and management's technology programme aims to widen this. On my working assumption, a 15% revenue beat over management plan would translate to c.15–25% EBITDA upside — well short of the multiple-of-profit outcome the strategy is looking for. There is no observable inflection point (no SaaS-style scale economics, no network effect, no capacity-constrained pricing power).
Value-trap signals
None identified. Revenue is growing, recurring fees are stable at 87%, balance sheet is net cash, dividend has been initiated (2.2p final + 1.0p interim), no going-concern issues, no customer concentration, no visible related-party abuses. The main "cheap for a reason" concern is the low AI-receiver score, not company-specific value-trap dynamics.
Earnings vs. expectations
- FY25 trading update (Jun-25): prior consensus revenue £216m / adj EBITDA £40.1m → delivered £224m / £41m → beat on both metrics 2025-06-06 trading update.
- H1 26 (Nov-25): full-year consensus £249.5m / £44m → H1 delivery £121.3m / £21.8m → in line, with H2 weighting confirmed 2025-11-20 H1 26.
- FY26 trading update (May-26): consensus £249.5m / £44m → delivered ~£251m / ~£46m → revenue in line, adjusted EBITDA ahead 2026-05-07 trading update. The pattern is short (three data points post-IPO) but consistently at or slightly above guidance — no misses, one clear beat, two in-line-or-better. Encouraging for a newly-listed name.
Conviction: 3 (moderate)
Anchors: (i) three consecutive credible print-then-beat cycles support methodology, (ii) net cash balance sheet and 87% recurring revenue make EBITDA a defensible base for multiple-based valuation, (iii) sector comps (Gateley, Begbies) give clear multiple anchors. Limits: (i) first statutory year is FY26, so we have no cycle-tested plc P&L; (ii) reported vs adjusted EBITDA gap is large and structural (bargain-purchase gains recur through the roll-up model, deemed remuneration amortisation is opaque) — quality of the £46m adjusted number is not fully clean; (iii) partner-model share of profit still creates ambiguity about the true sustainable operating margin.
Overall assessment for this investor profile: 370 / 1000
This is a high-quality UK small-cap at a fair price with a fortress balance sheet — but it fails two of the three explicit pillars: it is not an AI beneficiary (arguably a mild AI headwind long term as compliance work automates) and it has limited operating leverage in a labour-heavy services business. Right kind of company for a value-plus-quality book; wrong kind of company for the AI-receiver + operating-leverage strategy laid out in the brief.