INVESTACC GROUP LIMITED (INAC) — Research Note
Executive summary
InvestAcc is a UK specialist SIPP and SSAS pensions administrator listed on the LSE Main Market, pursuing a "buy and build" consolidation strategy in a fragmented UK pensions administration market (over 100 providers). Across the covered period it transitioned from a Marwyn-sponsored acquisition shell into an operating platform (InvestAcc acquisition Oct 2024, AJ Bell Platinum acquired Nov 2025 for up to £25m), delivering H1 26 revenue growth of 130% to £13.8m and a Trading EBITDA margin of 48.9%; it has now agreed to divest Vesta/IAL (non-core wealth management) for £12m to focus purely on specialist pensions administration 2026-10-08 disposal RNS; 2026-09-24 H1 26 interim. The single most important point for valuation today is whether the market is pricing the correct normalised earnings base post-Vesta disposal — group EBITDA is expected to clear the £9.1m FY26 market expectation 2026-08-17 trading update, while FCA consultation CP26/20 is a tailwind for consolidators.
Fair value estimate
- Fair value range: 185p – 230p per share → implied market cap £91m – £114m
- Mid-point: ~207p / £102m
- Methodology: Forward EV/EBITDA multiple on continuing-operations EBITDA, triangulated against (a) the arms-length placing at 170p dated 9 October 2026 and (b) the 9.2x FY25 EBITDA Vesta disposal multiple.
Key assumptions:
- FY26 Group EBITDA £9.5–10.5m (management flagged above-consensus £9.1m) 2026-08-17 trading update
- Strip out Vesta (~£1.3m EBITDA implied by 9.2x = £12m EV) to get continuing EBITDA of ~£8.2–9.2m
- Multiple range 10–12x (sector precedents 12.8x for £25–50m deals; targeted M&A at 5–8x) 2026-03-19 full-year 2025
- Net debt £12.7m at FY25 end 2026-03-19; proceeds of £10m from Vesta on completion early-2027 largely neutralise
Comparison to current market cap of £89.0m: Mid-point implies ~15% upside vs current 180p. Current price sits ~6% above the placing clear price of 170p.
Sector context
Correctly classified as Financial Services / Financials. The company's growth profile is above typical UK diversified financials (H1 26 organic revenue growth 56%); its EBITDA margin trajectory (Trading EBITDA 48.9%, Group target 30%+) is in line with established UK specialist financial platforms; its leverage is above typical sector peers (3.0x net debt/EBITDA at FY25). Listed peers include AJ Bell (AJB), Curtis Banks (prior to delisting; CEO Will Self is ex-Curtis Banks), Nucleus Financial / IntegraFin (IHP), and MattioliWoods (acquired).
Investment thesis
- Clear consolidator in a highly fragmented market — the top 5 UK SIPP administrators have just 46% of AuA with over 100 providers; FCA consultation CP26/20 (June 2026) is expected to disproportionately burden smaller providers and accelerate consolidation, with InvestAcc the obvious institutional-grade consumer of smaller books at 5–8x EBITDA 2026-09-24 H1 26 interim; 2026-03-19 FY25.
- Platform operating leverage is already visible — H1 26 Trading EBITDA margin expanded to 48.9% (H1 25: 46.7%) while Group EBITDA margin leapt from 21.6% to 35.2% as the fixed PLC cost base was absorbed by a 130% larger revenue number 2026-09-24 H1 26 interim.
- Disposal of Vesta sharpens the equity story and generates re-rating potential — The £12m sale at 9.2x FY25 EBITDA (completion ~early 2027) removes a non-core wealth/AR unit, reduces regulatory surface area, releases ~£10m cash for M&A, and leaves a pure-play specialist pensions administrator which should command a higher multiple 2026-10-08 disposal RNS.
Key risks
- Regulatory concentration risk — the UK pensions administration regime is in active consultation (CP26/20 to 2029-30 full compliance); FCA inheritance-tax changes effective April 2027 are already shifting demand mix 2026-09-24 H1 26 interim. Any adverse rule could reset margins.
- Treasury income is interest-rate dependent — H1 26 Treasury revenue grew 345% to £5.0m (36% of group revenue). This is high-quality in a steady-rate world but is a non-core earnings tail that could compress sharply if BoE cuts aggressively — unlike pension admin fees, treasury isn't locked in 2026-09-24.
- Related-party / governance complexity and dilution — Marwyn (via MIM LLP) controls 59.8% of ordinary shares, LTIP (A1/A2 Incentive Shares) is dilutive on exercise (960k+ shares at H1 25 valuation), MCLLP fees are significant, Chair/Marwyn directors not independent, Chair deemed non-independent on appointment per UK Corporate Governance Code 2025-04-24 final results 2024.
Operating leverage
This is one of the stronger paragraphs in the thesis. H1 26 shows a textbook fixed-cost platform at work: revenue grew 130% to £13.8m; operating costs grew 120% to £7.1m (variable, mostly reflecting acquired Platinum cost base); but Group costs grew only 25% (£1.5m → £1.9m) — PLC overhead is largely fixed. Group EBITDA margin expanded 1,360bps (21.6% → 35.2%) as a result. Management is explicit on long-term target of 30%+ Group EBITDA margin which is now in sight. Treasury income has effectively zero marginal cost once implemented, so interest-rate-tied revenue drops almost entirely to EBITDA. On any revenue beat of 10–20% from accelerated M&A plus organic SIPP Lite momentum (two-thirds of H1 26 new business), operating profit uplift could plausibly be 25–40% given PLC costs are set. The clearest inflection is the completed Treasury Function and SSAS platform consolidation — one-off costs now largely spent, benefits remain to come 2026-09-24; 2026-03-19.
Value-trap signals
- Pension scheme AuA £10.6bn is largely a reflection of market-level asset values; the business has very limited sensitivity to equity markets (fees are fixed sterling) but AuA growth may mask whether scheme count is really growing.
- Trading EBITDA margins look impressive partly because of treasury income; the "pure" pension admin margin is harder to isolate.
- Significant related-party fees (Marwyn Capital LLP ~£755k outstanding at H1 25) and heavy LTIP dilution to Marwyn/management 2025-09-25 H1 25 interim.
- Short operating history as a listed group under current structure (platform acquired Oct 2024).
None of these are terminal — this is a cash-generative, regulated business — but they warrant a modest valuation discount.
Earnings vs. expectations
Limited history as the operating group is just over 24 months old on the current structure. (a) FY25 results in March 2026 delivered revenue +43%, Trading EBITDA +62%, in line with communicated strategic plan. (b) 17 August 2026 pre-close update explicitly said full-year revenue and EBITDA would be above the £25.7m/£9.1m market expectations 2026-08-17. (c) H1 26 interim confirmed strong trajectory. Pattern: consistent beat or in-line vs. its own guidance; limited visible sell-side consensus history.
Conviction
3 — moderate.
Anchors (support): audited financials are clean and reconcile; management discloses Trading EBITDA, Group EBITDA, PLC costs, exceptional items separately; multiple valuation benchmarks converge (recent arms-length placing at 170p, Vesta disposal at 9.2x, sector precedents at 10–13x).
Limits: the business has only been in its current operating form for 24 months, so track record is thin; FY26 numbers will be the first clean post-integration view and are not yet reported; treasury income is a swing factor outside management control; opaque LTIP dilution complicates per-share analysis.