GLOBALDATA PLC (DATA) — Research Note

Executive summary

GlobalData is a UK-listed data, analytics and insights platform serving ~5,000 blue-chip clients across 20 industries via a subscription "One Platform" model (76% subscription revenue), with a majority-owned Healthcare division that private-equity firm Inflexion bought a 40% stake in during 2024 at a ~£1.115bn valuation (~22x EBITDA). The headline story over 2021–2026 is one of margin expansion (Adj EBITDA margin rose from ~32% in 2020 to peak 41% in 2023) followed by a sharp growth and margin reversion — FY25 underlying revenue growth was only 1% (vs. a "mid-to-high single digit" ambition) and H1 2026 came in at just 1% underlying with margin compressed to 34%. The single most important valuation point: the sum-of-the-parts, anchored by the still-recent Inflexion mark for Healthcare, implies materially more equity value than the current £380m market cap — but the market is now pricing in further deterioration, elevated financial leverage, and controlling-shareholder discount.

Fair value estimate

• Fair value range: 90p – 140p per share, implying market cap of £590m – £918m
• Methodology: sum-of-the-parts, cross-checked with EV/EBITDA multiples
  • Healthcare 60% stake: FY26 run-rate EBITDA ~£65m, at 12-15x (vs. Inflexion's 22x in 2024, discounted for the subsequent weak pharma-sector read-through and 1% underlying growth) = EV £780-975m. 60% to GlobalData = £470-585m
  • Non-Healthcare: FY26 run-rate EBITDA ~£50m at 7-10x (margin only 25% vs. Healthcare's 48%, slower growth, more cyclical end-markets) = £350-500m
  • Less net bank debt of £133m (H1 2026) 2026-09 half-year = equity value £687-952m
  • Per share (655.2m shares outstanding): 105p – 145p
• Current £380m mcap vs midpoint £820m → ~115% upside (midpoint 125p vs. 60.1p current)
• The implied market valuation of £380m less £133m debt = £247m EV, which is lower than the £437m value of the 40% Healthcare stake Inflexion paid in 2024 — i.e. the market is pricing the Non-Healthcare business as worth negative, which looks excessive even accounting for its weak growth.

Sector context

• Confirmed classification: Industrials / Industrial Goods and Services (ICB), but functionally this is a vertical B2B SaaS / data & analytics business rather than a classic industrial.
• Quality profile: above-sector-typical on recurring revenue mix and gross margin potential; below sector norm on growth consistency and governance (60.8% owned by founder CEO Mike Danson).
• Listed peers: RELX (RELX.L) (closest for data+analytics scale), Informa (INF.L) (events + intelligence), Euromoney (previously LN) / Dun & Bradstreet (DNB.N), and smaller YouGov (YOU.L) for data-platform comparison.

Investment thesis

• Sum-of-the-parts dislocation anchored to a recent third-party transaction: Inflexion paid £434m net for 40% of Healthcare in June 2024, implying £1.115bn for the whole Healthcare business 2024-07 half-year, 2025-03 FY2024. Even applying a steep discount to that mark, the 60% retained Healthcare stake alone covers more than the current £380m market cap. Non-Healthcare (£198.8m FY25 revenue, 25% EBITDA margin) is being valued at essentially zero.
• AI-enabled proprietary data moat with early monetisation signals: AI Hub adoption now at 90% of customers with 3x increase in active users, Microsoft 365 Copilot MCP integration launched, and the company is launching a wide-reaching AI-first transformation programme targeting both revenue uplift and operational efficiency 2026-09 half-year. Proprietary data (290 of 320 datasets) is a defensible foundation if the AI monetisation story materialises.
• High recurring revenue with strong forward visibility and quality capital returns: Subscription revenue is 76% of total, Contracted Forward Revenue grew 4% to £163.3m providing clear visibility into H2 2026 and FY27, value renewal rate rose to 91%. The company returned £189m to shareholders since 2024 via buybacks/tenders while also deploying £132m on 7 acquisitions 2026-09 half-year.

Key risks

• Repeated growth misses and transformation plan undershooting: FY25 delivered 1% underlying growth vs. a 10% ambition; H1 2026 again 1%; FY26 guidance now at the lower end of consensus with EBITDA below expectations. The 2024-2026 Growth Transformation Plan originally targeted ~£500m revenue by end-2026 — now looks structurally out of reach 2026-09 half-year, 2026-07 trading update.
• Controlling shareholder and governance concerns: Mike Danson owns 60.8-61.4% of shares. Historical related-party transactions (NSMGL, Estel properties, BTMI acquisition from a Danson-controlled entity) have been reduced but create ongoing minority-shareholder discount. CFO Graham Lilley stepping down (replaced by Robert Kingston from Keywords Studios in Q3 2026) adds transition risk 2026-03 FY2025.
• Rising leverage and complex capital structure: Net bank debt jumped from £16.8m at H1 2025 to £133m at H1 2026 (£181m gross borrowings less £48m cash) following M&A and buybacks, with facilities upsized by £60m in July 2026 to £245m. Combined with the 40% Healthcare NCI and the £3m customer-relationship impairment taken in H1 2026 (due to lower-than-forecast renewal rates on acquired customer bases), the quality of reported earnings is deteriorating 2026-09 half-year.

Operating leverage

GlobalData's business model theoretically has very high operating leverage — a largely fixed cost base (analysts, researchers, platform infrastructure, central functions) with incremental revenue dropping to a high contribution margin. However, the operating leverage has been invisible in practice over 2024-2026: when FY25 revenue grew 13% reported (1% underlying + M&A + currency), Adj EBITDA actually fell 6% to £110.2m and margin compressed from 41% to 34% 2026-03 FY2025. In H1 2026, revenue grew 4% but underlying Adj EBITDA was flat. Management attributes this to investment in sales headcount, M&A integration costs, and AI-first transformation spending. The Healthcare segment is the proof point for latent operating leverage: 48% EBITDA margin on £65m H1 2026 revenue, vs. Non-Healthcare at only 25% on £98m. If underlying revenue growth accelerates to even 5-6% (vs. 1% currently) and investment phase normalises, incremental margin should be 50%+ — a 10% revenue beat vs. current trajectory could plausibly add 20-30% to Adjusted EBITDA. The medium-term target of 40% group margin (previously 45%, now moderated) is the inflection worth watching.

Value-trap signals

• Growth has decelerated from double-digits (pre-2023) → 7% underlying (2023) → 4% (2024) → 1% (2025) → 1% (H1 2026) — a clear negative trend, not a one-off.
• Share-based payment LTIP targets (£110m, £125m, £145m EBITDA for 2025/2026/2027) repeatedly judged unlikely to be met, resulting in £20.5m credit to income statement in FY25 (reversing prior accruals). Management genuinely has not been able to hit its own operational targets.
• 60.8% controlling shareholder with ongoing (though reducing) related-party history.
• £3m H1 2026 impairment of acquired customer relationship intangibles explicitly linked to "lower renewal rates than originally forecasted" — implies acquisitions are underperforming vs. deal models.
• Repeated downgrades to FY26 guidance (January, July, September 2026 all progressively lower).

Earnings vs. expectations

Tracking the trading-update → results cadence shows a pattern of in-line to slightly disappointing rather than material misses, but with the goalposts being quietly moved. H1 2024 (31 July 2024): results slightly ahead of expectations, Adj EBITDA margin at 41%. 10 January 2025 trading update: "In line with market expectations"; actual FY24 Adj EBITDA £116.8m vs. consensus £117-123m — at the bottom of the range. FY25 (2 March 2026): "Resilient performance" but EBITDA down 6% to £110.2m with margin falling from 41% to 34%. July 2026 trading update: FY26 at low end of consensus; September 2026 H1: FY26 Adj EBITDA now explicitly guided below market expectations. The pattern is one of soft misses and quietly reduced ambitions — the £500m revenue by 2026 and 45% margin targets set in late 2023 have both been quietly abandoned.

Conviction

Conviction: 3 (moderate)

Anchors:

• The Inflexion Healthcare transaction is a recent, arm's-length third-party mark that directly supports a sum-of-the-parts valuation materially above the current share price.
• Disclosure is clean and detailed; audited financials from Deloitte with unqualified opinions; segmentation into Healthcare / Non-Healthcare is now explicit.
• Multiple cross-checking valuation approaches (SOTP, EV/EBITDA on segments) converge on a similar range.

Limits:

• The deteriorating growth trajectory and repeated guidance cuts create genuine uncertainty around normalised EBITDA — the fair-value range depends heavily on whether 1% underlying is a trough or a new normal.
• Controlling-shareholder discount is real and difficult to quantify; the 2025 PE-approach discussions terminated at prices the Board rejected (implying management views current share price as significantly undervalued, but minority holders cannot force a transaction).