CHECKIT PLC (CKT) — Investment Research Note
Executive summary
Checkit is a UK-listed vertical SaaS/IoT platform combining medical-grade sensor monitoring with digital workflow software, sold predominantly into US plasma-collection centres, NHS trusts, private hospitals and premium multi-site retail/hospitality operators. After three years of losses, cost restructuring (£4m annualised savings in FY26, headcount 165→117) and a strategic focus on recurring revenue (97% of H1 FY27) drove the business to adjusted EBITDA break-even in FY26 and £0.3m adj. EBITDA in H1 FY27 despite only 3–4% revenue growth — a textbook operating-leverage inflection 2026-09-28 H1 FY27, 2026-04-21 FY26. The single most valuation-relevant point today: a Formal Sale Process launched March 2026 was terminated in September 2026 with no offers at values the Board could recommend, meaning strategic buyers priced the equity well below current expectations even with cost-normalisation synergies stripped in.
Fair value estimate
Fair value range: 22p – 32p per share (implied market cap £24m – £35m)
Methodology: EV/ARR multiple triangulated with EV/forward-EBITDA sense-check.
- Continuing ARR at 31 July 2026: £12.8m 2026-09-28 H1 FY27
- Balance-sheet cash: £2.9m; no financial debt
- Range applies 1.7x – 2.5x EV/ARR for a sub-scale, EBITDA-breakeven-but-improving vertical SaaS on AIM with 94% gross retention, 97% recurring mix, and demonstrable operating leverage — but sub-£15m ARR and no bidder found in a formal process
- Mid-point EV
£25m + £2.9m cash → **£28m market cap →26p per share (+15% vs 22.5p)**
Sense-check: at ~£1.5m FY28E adj. EBITDA (adding 10% ARR growth × ~70% contribution margin to the £0.6m H1 FY27 run-rate), 15–20x EV/EBITDA gives £22–30m EV — consistent.
Comparison to £24.3m current market cap: the shares sit in the lower half of the fair-value range. View: fair, with modest upside.
Sector context
Classification confirmed: Technology / vertical SaaS + industrial IoT hybrid. Quality vs sector peers is below average on scale (sub-£15m ARR vs UK SaaS peers £50m+), in line on gross margin (69%), above average on customer stickiness (94% GRR, 102% NRR), and below average on balance-sheet resilience (only £2.9m cash vs £11m two years ago). Nearest listed proxies: Cerillion (billing SaaS), dotDigital (marketing SaaS), Craneware (US healthcare SaaS) — all substantially larger and higher-multiple. Closest direct comparable, Crimson Tide (mpro5 workflow SaaS), was the target of Checkit's own aborted 2025 merger and demonstrates how thin the AIM workflow-SaaS peer set is.
Investment thesis
- Clear inflection to profitability with high operating leverage. H1 FY27 adj. EBITDA swung by £1.2m to a £0.3m profit on only £0.2m of revenue growth, evidencing the £4m cost-programme benefit landing on a 97%-recurring, 69%-gross-margin base 2026-09-28 H1 FY27. Each incremental £1m of ARR should convert at ~70% to EBITDA against a now-stable fixed cost base.
- Sticky, regulated Medical franchise (71% of H1 FY27 revenue) with defensible integration. Positions with UK NHS, US plasma-collection networks (e.g. Octapharma expansion signed June 2024), private hospitals and biotech; Board is unifying the platform onto one modern cloud codebase (Next-Gen Medical Monitoring) enabling workflow cross-sell into a customer base that previously only had sensing 2026-09-28 H1 FY27, 2025-08-26 H1 FY26.
- Downside supported by strategic optionality and net cash. Even after a failed FSP, the process "provided valuable external validation of the strength of technology, customer proposition and position in regulated environments" 2026-09-28. £2.9m net cash, no debt, positive H2 FY26 and H1 FY27 operating cash flow (£0.7m in H1 FY27), and £5.8m of contracted deferred revenue provide a working-capital cushion.
Key risks
- Sub-scale balance sheet. £2.9m cash against £0.7m H1 capex and ongoing platform-unification investment leaves limited margin for error; a single bad quarter could force a placing at a depressed price 2026-09-28 H1 FY27.
- ARR growth remains anaemic and gross retention below target. Constant-currency ARR growth 5%, GRR 94% vs stated 95%+ target, NRR 102% vs 105–110% target; the two-year value-creation framework is contingent on tighter execution that management admits is required, not delivered 2026-09-28. Legacy product retirement removed £1.6m ARR — an admission that not all revenue was defensible.
- Failed FSP and repeated aborted M&A are a governance/valuation signal. Six unsolicited approaches in FY26 and a formal process yielded no recommendable offer; the Crimson Tide merger was abandoned; the earlier Crimson Tide MSA was disrupted by an Ideagen approach 2026-04-21 FY26, 2025-04-24 FY25, 2025-02-11 Merger. Cumulatively suggests trade buyers see less strategic value than the Board does.
Operating leverage
Operating leverage is the single most attractive attribute of this stock. The FY26 cost programme reset the fixed cost base to c.£8–9m of operating expenses supporting 97% recurring revenue at 69% gross margin. The H1 comparison is the proof point: revenue +£0.2m, gross profit +£0.3m, opex −£0.9m, adj. EBITDA +£1.2m 2026-09-28. On a forward basis, assuming opex holds and gross margin trends toward 70%+, each incremental £1m of ARR should contribute ~£0.7m to adjusted EBITDA. A 15% ARR beat vs plan (£1.9m of extra recurring revenue) would plausibly triple EBITDA to £1.5m+. Inflection points are visible: (i) the £0.7m annualised cost saving from legacy product retirement, (ii) planned Q4 FY27 launch of Next-Gen Medical Monitoring enabling workflow cross-sell into medical customers "for the first time" 2026-04-21 FY26, and (iii) platform unification reducing duplicated R&D/infrastructure. Cited leverage is real, though the base is small enough that a £1–2m EBITDA outcome is still a modest absolute number.
Value-trap signals
- Total revenue declining (£14.1m → £13.7m → £12.1m continuing) even before discontinued-operation reclassification
- Formal Sale Process failed to attract recommendable offers — the clearest market-validated signal that strategic buyers see limited upside
- Customer concentration: one customer 13% of revenue 2026-04-21 FY26
- Repeated aborted M&A (Crimson Tide 2025, six unsolicited approaches during FY26)
- ARR growth reliant on excluding a "single large US customer" contraction each year — a recurring "underlying" adjustment
- Sub-scale and dependent on continued expense discipline against thin £2.9m cash
Earnings vs. expectations
Where analyst consensus is referenced: FY24 delivered in line ("in line with the Board's and market expectations") 2024-04-25; H1 FY25 delivered "in line" with LBITDA better than expected 2024-09-12; FY26 delivered EBITDA break-even ahead of expectations of a £0.7m loss and cash ahead of the £15.2m consensus 2026-02-19 trading update, 2026-04-21 FY26; H1 FY27 delivered EBITDA and cash ahead of prior-year comparables consistent with guidance 2026-09-28. The pattern is broadly meet-to-beat on cost/profit, meet-to-slightly-miss on top-line — bookings and ARR growth has repeatedly been characterised as "impacted by lengthening sales cycles" or "one large US customer" contractions. Net: profit trajectory has beaten, revenue growth has disappointed.
Conviction
Conviction: 3 (moderate). Anchors: (i) financials are cleanly disclosed and audit-unqualified, (ii) the operating-leverage math is well-evidenced by the H1 FY27 print, (iii) the FSP outcome provides an independent, market-tested cap on strategic value. Limiters: (i) fair value is highly sensitive to which EV/ARR multiple is chosen — a 1.5x vs 2.5x range spans 30% up or 15% down from spot, (ii) the business is sub-scale enough that a modest execution stumble could invalidate the profitability thesis quickly.